Against the backdrop of Walter Benjamin's famous essay, “Unpacking My Library”, this article, by the Librarian of the Warburg Institute, tells the story of the many times that the Warburg Library has been packed and unpacked. First it was the private collection of Aby Warburg, later a public institution, originally in Hamburg and then in London from 1933 to the present. This essay also explores the various ways in which books have been — and continue to be — acquired (...) by the Warburg Library, including publication, donation, recommendation, and purchase. Each of these methods is not only discussed but also examined in light of Benjamin's account of the acquisition of his own library. Moreover, Benjamin's view that collections lose their meaning when they cease to be personal is challenged by the example of the Warburg Library, which has been transformed from a private collection containing around 15,000 books in 1911 to a public institution today housing over 350,000 volumes, while still maintaining its unique character. (shrink)

Michael Quante, Menschenwürde und personale Autonomie. Demokratische Werte im Kontext der Lebenswissenschaften Content Type Journal Article Pages 601-603 DOI 10.1007/s10677-011-9278-7 Authors Claudia Wiesemann, Department of Medical Ethics and History of Medicine, University Medical Center Göttingen, Humboldtallee 36, 37073 Göttingen, Germany Journal Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Online ISSN 1572-8447 Print ISSN 1386-2820 Journal Volume Volume 14 Journal Issue Volume 14, Number 5.

The following reflections are submitted in awareness of an unfortunate situation which currently finds both psychologists and philosophers concerned with the search after criteria for assessing human conduct, yet with either profession suspicious of the contributions to be expected from the other. The objections frequently entertained against psychologizing philosophers are only matched by those entertained against philosophizing psychologists. Yet, if the worst is said, it still remains true that much psychological work, devoted to problems of mental health, maturity or neurosis, (...) makes contact with moral issues. It also is true that such contact has so far not been fruitful to the point of encouraging psychologists or philosophers to expect new illumination from each other. Unless it be groundless, in principle, to look towards psychological findings as potentially relevant for moral theory or vice versa, it would seem that the only cure for poor relations between the two disciplines are better ones rather than none at all. At any rate, it is on the assumption that more successful relations are possible that I shall now comment upon what appears to be both a most influential and unsuccessful attempt by one psychologist to solve an ethical problem. I shall take my departure from B. F. Skinner's recent Science and Human Behavior,∗ especially from his chapters on value and the survival concept. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The humble origins of Russell's paradox by J. Alberto Coffa ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS Russell pointed out that the discovery of his celebrated paradox concerning the class of all classes not belonging to themselves was intimately related to Cantor's proof that there is no greatest cardinal. lOne of the earliest remarks to that effect occurs in The Principles ofMathematics where, referring to the universal class, the class of all classes (...) and the class of all propositions, he notes that when we apply the reasoning of his [Cantor's] proofto the cases in question we find ourselves met by definite contradictions, of which the one discussed in Chapter x is an example. (P. 362) And in a footnote he adds: "It was in this way that I discovered this contradiction". Throughout his writings Russell left a number ofhints concerning the sort of connection he had drawn between Cantor's proof and his own discovery. In fact, his suggestions are so specific that there would seem to be little room left for speculation concerning how the discovery took place.2 The picture that emerges almost immediately from Russell's observations is the following. For reasons which are 1 See, e.g., Bertrand Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, 2nd ed. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1937), §§100, 344-9; G. Frege, Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1976), pp. 215-16; B. Russell, Essays in Analysis, ed. D. Lackey (New York: George Braziller, 1973), p. 139; B. Russell, Introducrion to Mathemarical Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), p. 136; B. Russell, My Philosophical Development (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), pp. 75-6; The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, I (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), 195. 2 See, e.g., Ch. Thiel's "Einleitung des Herausgebers" in Frege, Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel, pp. 203 and 216 (footnote), and 1. Grattan-Guinness, "How Bertrand Russell Discovered his Paradox", Historia Marhematica, 5 (1978),127-37. 31 32 Russell, nos. 33-4 (Spring-Summer 1979) never made clear, Russell decided to analyze Cantor's argument applying it to "large" classes such as the universal class V, and the class of all classes. When, for example, we consider V, its power set and the correlationf(x) = {x} if x is not a class, f(x) =. x otherwise, then Cantor's diagonal class D turns out to be the class of all classes not belonging to themselves. Moreover, since the element ofV which is taken toD byfisD itself(i.e., sincef(D) = D), Cantor's reasoning invites us to raise the question whether D belongs tof(D) (i.e., toD) or not; and it establishes that it does precisely if it doesn't.3 The purpose of this note is to present recently uncovered information that complements and corrects our present understanding of Russell's discovery of his paradox. As it turns out, far from originating from his desire to apply the ideas in Cantor's theorem, a version of Russell's paradox first occurred in an argument that Russell had devised, late in 1900, in order to establish the invalidity of that theorem. An appeal to "large" classes such as V or Class was, as we shall see, essential to Russell's attempted refutation. As he displayed the details of his counterexample Russell's paradox emerged, at first unrecognized, as the by-product of a project that the paradox itself would eventually undermine. In a paper written in 1901 and largely devoted to a popular exposition and defence of Cantor's theory of the infinite, Russell expressed what appeared to be a rpinor reservation to Cantor's treatment : There is a greatest of all infinite numbers, which is the number of things altogether, of every sort and kind. It is obvious that there cannot be a greater number than this, because, if everything has been taken, there is nothing left to add. Cantor has a proof that there is no greatest number, and if this proof were valid, the contradictions of infinity would reappear in a sublimated form. But in this one point, the master has been guilty of a very subtle fallacy, which I hope to explain in some future work.4 3 See Principles, §349. Perhaps I should remind... (shrink)

[The review is in German] Theunissen has developed an interesting account of metaphilosophy that–as a discipline–does not start in 1960s, but already and especially with Kant, Fichte and Hegel. The constant growth of philosophical theories around 1800 (what Koselleck called “Sattelzeit”) made metaphilosophical constructions necessary. He reads–and is not the first author who does so–Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit as a metaphilosophical theory. Although I like and share many ideas with Theunissen, there are three objections that I raise in my review: (...) (i) His account of isosthenia as a basic problem behind all philosophical positions (which makes metaphilosophy necessary) undermines the importance of dissent, dogmatism and intra-philosophical struggles; (ii) Theunissen’s understanding of metaphilosophy is not neutral (just as any account of metaphilosophy): it is predetermined by Hegel’s thought and the author’s understanding of Phenomenology of Spirit; (iii) Therefore, it fits well to this particular work of Hegel, but not (a) to the overall system of Encyclopedia and (b) Kant’s metaphilosophical deliberations (which Theunissen misses). I end the review with the statement that we need to ask ourselves how metaphilosophy is possible as a unified discipline despite of different philosophical backgrounds of authors–we need a meta-metaphilosophy or a critique of metaphilosophical reason. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:488 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY most extensive study of this aspect of Schelling's thought, at least until 1806. However, even if Schelling was not, as it is frequently stated, indifferent to the problems and the vicissitudes of politics, his theoretical thinking on this subject never went beyond temporary systematizations, to be given up, or modified, after a while. The author shows how Schelling, especially in this fieM, was influenced either (...) by his environment in general, or by some personalities he happened to contact: first his "republican" and francofile friends of the Ttibingen Stilt, afterwards the romantic circle of Jena, and, between 1801 and 1803, Hegel. The author studies in his first chapter, devoted tO the non-philosophic writings of the TUbingen period (1790-1795), not only Kant's and Herder's influence on Schelling, which are usually taken for granted, but also the impact of C. G. Heine and of other GSttingen scholars. This is a stimulating suggestion, showing the need for a more detailed study on the diffusion of the "historicocritical" method in circles, as the Ttibingen school, dominated rather by philosophical and theological than by philological and historical interests. In the following chapters, Schelling is closely related again to the intellectual history of his time; Schelling's relationship to the Aufkliirer Nicolai produces some surprises, and the same may be said about some new particulars (implementing F. Rosenzweig's and F. Bthm's research) on the close connection between Schelling and Htlderlin in 1795-1796. The fourth chapter is devoted to the correlation between theories on "natural philosophy" and moral political theories. The fifth concerns the philosophy of history and of government. This remarkable study, founded on sound scholarship, and conducted with a sharp historical mind, is to be recommended not only to students of Schelling, but to all those who have some interest in early XIXth Century German political thought. GIORGIO TONELLI State University of New York at Binghamton Gesammelte Werke, Vol. IV. By Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Ed. Hartmut Buehner and Otto Ptggeler. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968. Pp. 622. DM 86.00) Despite the high reputation Germany has long enjoyed with regard to its scientifically reliable editions, up to this very moment, a historic-critical edition of the totality of Hegel's works has not existed. There were only provisional texts of single works available whose philological reliability differed in its sometimes doubtful variety. This is a rather strange fact, considering that Hegel died in 1831. It can be explained only by a phenomenon peculiar to this philosopher: at the peak of his fame, numerous students from all countries of the world attended Hegel's lectures, assiduously taking notes and frequently publishing as authentic what they had understood and jotted down. The philosopher was very generotis in authorizing various versions of his lectures and thus, the international market was swamped with quite incongruous editions of some of his writings at the moment of Hegel's death. Despite this rather confused state of affairs, distinguished scholars have tried, for BOOK REVIEWS 489 more than six decades, to bring order into the posthumous manuscripts of the philosopher, and these efforts were successful, but only to a certain extent. Next to the pioneering publications of Wilhelm Dilthey, Herman Nohl and Frans Rosenzweig, lesser known savants, in the first place, Georg Lasson and Johannes Hoffmeister have devoted many years of self-denying efforts to make /mportant parts of Hegel's manuscripts available to the public and looked for new possibilities to edit the large body of lectures. But the task proved too difficult for individual scholars. For this reason, the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, a government-sponsored organization, has commissioned the publication of an all-encompassing historic-critical edition of Hegel's works and arranged for the appointment of a senatorial commission for advising the editors of such a mammoth undertaking. Members of the commission were the aforementioned scholars (see title) and W. Wieland. The Ministry of Education of the State of Nordrhein-Westfalen has opened a research center, originally directed by F. Nicolin, since 1968 by O. Ptggeler. Thus the edition can now be published continuously. Before discussing the contents of volume four, the only volume hitherto published, let's take... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kant-Index: Band 5: Stellenindex und Konkordanz zur "Wiener Logik,"Riccardo PozzoNorbert Hinske. Kant-Index: Band 5: Stellenindex und Konkordanz zur "Wiener Logik," Erstellt in Zusammenarbeit mit Heinrich P. Delfosse und Michael Oberhausen unter Mitwirkung von Hans-Werner Bartz, Christian Popp, Tina Strauch und Michael Trauth. Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 1999. Pp. Cxiii + 865.The Wiener Logik has long led a shadowy existence. This has nothing to do with the quality of the (...) text, but rather with accidental conditions. When the manuscript of the Wiener Logik was discovered in 1913, the planning of the Akademie-Ausgabe of Kant's complete works had already been largely completed and eight volumes of the works, three of the correspondence and two of the Nachlaß were published. Erich Adickes' edition of Kant's Reflexionen über die Logik appeared in 1914. Hinske suggests that, had Adickes considered it, the Wiener Logik would have played a valuable role in integrating Kant's reflections (xi). This double-volume makes up for all this by highlighting the relevance of this lecture transcript with special reference to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, which is close to it not only in time but also systematically. It contains a lemmatized main index that makes a recognition of the language of the logic course possible and a concordance that allows one to check the corresponding passages. The introduction and more than twenty pages of editorial notes elaborate on the relationship of the Wiener Logik to other Kantian texts while correcting and integrating the references to sources indicated in its 1966 edition by Gerhard Lehmann within the Akademie-Ausgabe (lxxii-xcvi). At the same time, the index correcs more than one hundred fifty errors of the 1966 edition (lviii-lxvii).The Wiener Logik was translated into English by J. Michael Young in the volume of The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant dedicated to the Lectures on Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 251-377). Young made clear that the Wiener Logik is constituted by two different parts (ibid., xxv f.). In fact the manuscript shows a first part written by the hand of a professional copyist, which covers Kant's course until almost the end of the theory of judgement (Akademie-Ausgabe, vol. 24, 790-937), and a second part constituted by a single page written by another hand (probably a student while sitting in Kant's classroom), which deals with the very end of the theory of judgement and the beginning of the theory of syllogism (ibid., 937-40). One needs to recall, though, that the text of the Wiener Logik is incomplete, given that a large part of the theory of syllogism as well as the theory of method, of discourse and of character are missing. The first part of the Wiener Logik shows several parallels with the edited fragments of the Logik Hoffmann (ibid., 944-52), while the second part shows parallels with the Logik Hechsel, which was discovered in 1983 and has recently been made accessible by Tilman Pinder (cf. Logik-Vorlesungen: Unveröffentliche Nachschriften, Hamburg: Meiner, 1998, 271-499). In fact, J. Michael Young found it convenient to complete his translation of the missing parts of the Wiener Logik by the attaching to it the corresponding parts of the Logik Hechsel (cf. Lectures on Logic, 381-423).Hinske provides new arguments as regards the dating of the Wiener Logik by objecting to both the late dating to the nineties suggested by Wilhelm Jerusalem and the early dating before 1781 by Reinhard Brandt and Tilman Pinder. Hinske remarks that while for the terminus ad quem one should consider the years indicated on the frontispice (1794 [End Page 284] and 1796), the terminus a quo should be set after the final redaction of the Critique of Pure Reason (xxiii f.). Following Hinske's lead and on the basis of an accurate examination on the cross-references between the texts, Bruno Bianco has proposed that the terminus a quo be set not before the publication of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (cf. the Italian translation edited by Bianco, Milan: Angeli, forthcoming).What makes the Wiener Logik and this index particularly interesting for Kant... (shrink)

Las fuentes principales para la reconstrucción de la teoría del conocimiento de Hegel en su Sistema maduro son la filosofía del espíritu subjetivo y la Lógica subjetiva o Lógica del Concepto. En este respecto, la filosofía del Espíritu Absoluto ocupa en principio, dentro de la estrategia general adoptada por Hegel para exponer su pensamiento gnoseológico, un lugar periférico; sin embargo, toda vez que las formas del Espíritu Absoluto, esto es, el Arte, la Religión y la Filosofía, son para Hegel resultados (...) de la progresiva explicitación del tipo de contenidos que implica la lógica interna de los sucesivos actos cognitivos del sujeto, en el marco de la exposición de la filosofía del Espíritu Absoluto Hegel desarrolla y precisa ulteriormente su teoría general sobre los actos de conocimiento. En este contexto, el tratamiento del concepto de la religión en las lecciones berlinesas sobre filosofía de la religión ofrece una oportunidad privilegiada -por regla general inadvertida- para profundizar en el análisis de las reflexiones de Hegel sobre el fenómeno del conocimiento humano. En sus cuatro cursos berlineses -1821, 1824, 1827 y 1831- sobre filosofía de la religión, Hegel divide a esta disciplina en tres partes, a saber: el Concepto de la Religión, la Religión Determinada y la Religión Consumada; en la primera de esas partes, esto es, en la que dedica al concepto de la religión, Hegel desarrolla las diferentes formas subjetivas de la conciencia religiosa sin considerar su contenido (de su contenido versarán las dos partes siguientes), es decir, analiza los actos cognitivos del sujeto de un modo puramente formal, tal como lo había hecho antes en el marco de la filosofía del espíritu subjetivo. En esta medida, la exposición del concepto de la religión ofrece una verdadera filosofía del espíritu subjetivo en compendio en la que se retoman, pero también se complementan las tesis expuestas en la filosofía del espíritu subjetivo -más precisamente, en la Psicología- en sentido estricto. El objetivo de nuestro trabajo es analizar la teoría de los actos de conocimiento presente en las Lecciones sobre Filosofía de la Religión; en razón de los requisitos de extensión que debe cumplir este trabajo, nos limitaremos a analizar los desarrollos que Hegel ofrece en el manuscrito que usa como texto base para el dictado de su primera Lección sobre Filosofía de la Religión en el semestre de verano de 1821 (cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen. Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte. Bd. 3. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion. 1. Einleitung und Begriff der Religion, Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 1983, pp. 95-163). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 239 die Herausgeber nicht mit, von wem. Jedem Dialog geht eine Gliederung voran; jeder Band ist mit einer recht brauchbaren Bibliographie versehen. Es ist erstaunlich zu erfahren, dass der erste Band, erstmalig in 1957 erschienen, in 1963 eine Auflage von 78000 erreicht hat; bleiben auch die Auflageziffern der fibrigen B~inde dahinter zurfick, so sind sie doch genfigend eindrucksvoll. Man wfinscht, der Verlag m6chte doch, durch diesen Erfolg (...) ermutigt, das nach Obgesagtem noch Fehlende--und dazu noch Platons Gedichte--in einem Erg~inzungsband bringen, wie immer man fiber die Echtheit der Stficke denkt. Der stilistische Unterschied zwischen den ~bersetzungen von Schleiermacher (erstmalig: 1804-1810) und von H. und F. H. Mfiller ist ausserordentlich. Dies ist nicht etwa auf die gr6ssere Sprachmeisterschaff Schleiermachers zurfickfiihren. Vielmehr liegt seiner Obersetzungsmethode eine h6chst interessante Theorie zugrunde (die F. A. Wolff, der Schleiermachers ~bersetzung verhShnt und Wilamowitz, der sie als ungeniessbar bezeichnet hatte, offenbar unbekannt war). Dieser Theorie zufolge ist es die Aufgabe des ~2bersetzers, den Leser besffindig daran zu erinnern, dass er nur eine l~bersetzung vor sich hat. Einem ~bersetzer, der sich brfistet, dass sich sein Text so liest, wie ihn der Autor geschrieben h~itte, wenn er in der Sprache des ~bersetzers und seines Publikums gedacht h~itte, sollte erwidert werden "Daffir bin ich dir so dankbar, wie ich es w~ire, wenn du mir das Bild eines Mannes zeigtest und sagtest--So wiirde er ausgesehen haben, wenn ihn mit seiner Mutter ein anderer Vater gezeugt h~tte." In anderen Worten: da sich Inhalt und Ausdruck nicht abtrennen lassen, sollte der f2bersetzer, start das Original seiner Sprache anzueignen, vielmehr--wir gebrauchen hier den bekannten Brechtschen Begriff--im Leser einen Verfremdungseffekt erzeugen. Wie man sieht, ist Schleiermachers ~3bersetzungstheorie jeder "rationalistischen " strikte entgegengesetzt; ja, man k6nnte sagen, dass sie das ganze Wesen des Romantisch-Irrationalen eben auf ein Einzelproblem, das des l~bersetzens angewendet, aufs beste ausdrfickt. Und Schleiermachers f2bersetzungspraxis entspricht genau seiner Theorie. Dies ist ihre Eigentfimlichkeit. Und ich denke, dass diese Theorie mehr Au{merksamkeit verdient, als ihr in den nie endenden Diskussionen darfiber, welchen Prinzipien der Obersetzer folgen sollte, geschenkt wird. PHILIP MERLAN Scripps College, Claremont, Calif. Platon der Erzieher. Von Julius Stenzel. Mit einer Einffihrung von Konrad Gaiser. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1961. Pp. xxx + 337. DM 26.) Platon der Erzieher was first published in 1927. The present edition, with 240 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY the exception of the preface by Gaiser, is an exact reproduction of the earlier one. As a reviewer of the reissue, I feel myself obligated to formulate what seems to me relevant today. I remember that, when I read the first edition about the time of its appearance, I was full of admiration and felt myself indebted to the book for many years. Today it seems to me more dated than most writings on Plato of that period, including various publications of Stenzel. Criticizing Platon der Erzieher, I criticize what I once read differently. Julius Stenzel had earlier established his reputation as a Platonic scholar with his Studien zur Entwicklung der platonischen Dialektik von Sokrates zu Aristoteles (1917). This book as well as most of Stenzel's later investigations have exercised a considerable influence on international Platonic scholarship. In Germany it prefaced a new approach to ancient and especially to Platonic philosophy. In spite of the spadework done by German scholars in the nineteenth century and still by men like Apelt, Constantin Ritter and Theodor Gomperz, Plato's image in German thought about the end of the First World War was mainly determined by three sources: the neo-Kantian interpretation and Natorp's monograph in particular ; the highly original but very personal and philosophically naive "biography" of Wilamowitz-Moellendorff; and the vision of the Plato gestalt by the George circle. Stenzel dedicated the Studien to Wilamowitz and, while paying his respect to Natorp, stated that in contrast to the philosophical Plato interpretation of the Marburg school, he had chosen a philological and historical approach. As for the George circle, he did not acknowledge its significance, though I believe that at least in his later works he was indirectly influenced by it. In the years following World War I, it became important that Stenzel and... (shrink)